CWIHP Bulletin nr 8 9 part 5 More ev

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MONDAY, 5 NOVEMBER AT THREE
IN THE AFTERNOON.
After hearing Mikoyan, Fidel says:
We consider that the intentions of the So-
viet Government cannot be determined only
by the analysis of what happened in face of
an unforeseen situation. Instead, they should
be analyzed taking into account the set of
agreements we have reached - the weapons
were brought under those precepts. One of
them is the military agreement that was to
be published once all the weapons were
brought in and once the Elections were held
in the United States. These agreements rep-
resent a firm desire of the Soviet Union.5
That is why this has to be analyzed
under the light of what we intended to do
and not under the light of what happened.
If all the steps were carried out, we
have no doubt that they would have served
as a containment to the plans of the North
Americans to attack our country. And the
objectives of the Soviet Government and
Cuba would have been attained.
At the same time, we knew that the
deployment of missiles in Cuba had in sight
the defense of the Socialist Camp. They
were important not only in military terms,
but also from a psychological and political
point of view. Besides serving the interests
of Cuba, they served the interests of the
Socialist Camp as a whole, and we evidently
agreed with that. That is how we have un-
derstood the step taken, and we also under-
stand it was a step in the right direction. We
also agree with the need that a war be
avoided and we do not oppose that. In this
case, all the measures oriented to attain the
two objectives were undertaken. We are in
absolute agreement with the goals sought
by the Soviet Union, the misunderstandings
arise as a result of the way they were at-
tained. We also understand that the circum-
stances were compelling. They were not one
hundred percent normal.
In assessing how the events occurred,
we think they could have been dealt with
differently. For instance, one thing discussed
is the impact that my letter had on the So-
viet Government’s decision of the [October]
28th. And it is evident that my letter had
nothing to do with the course of the events -
given the messages that were exchanged be-
tween the Soviet and North American Gov-
ernments on the 26 and 27. My letter’s only
goal was to inform the Soviet Government
of the imminent attack, and it did not con-
tain any hesitation on our part. Furthermore,
we expressed that we did not expect an in-
vasion. We expressed that the invasion was
possible, but we understood that it was the
least probable variant. The most probable
event was an aerial attack to destroy the stra-
tegic weapons.
The Soviet Government’s decision on
the 28, is based on the letter to Kennedy and
the response on the 27. The real basis for
the 28 decision lies within these two docu-
ments. Kennedy’s letter on the 28 was an
agreement to the proposals Khrushchev sent
on the 26 - in the sense that he [Krushchev]
was willing to resolve the issue of all the
weapons if the U.S. ceased the aggression.
The aggression was the only reason for the
military strengthening of Cuba.
Once Kennedy accepted this proposal
- which we did not know of - the conditions
were set to carry it out starting with a decla-
ration by the Soviets stating that their side
was on board and that they would proceed
to discuss it with the Cuban Government.
I think that such a declaration, instead
of communicating an order to withdraw the
Strategic Weapons, would have decreased
the tension and would have allowed to carry
the discussions in better terms.
But this is a mere analysis of what hap-
pened, it does not matter now. What mat-
ters now is simply to know what to do and
how to attain the main goals that are to stop
the aggression and to secure the peace at
the same time. If a true and effective peace
are attained in the near future, then - under
the light of the recent events - we will be
able to judge better the steps taken. The fu-
ture outcome - for which we need to struggle
- will either credit or discredit the value of
the acts of the present. It is evident that at-
taining that outcome does not depend so
much on us. We are very grateful for all the
explanations given and of the effort made
for us to understand the things that occurred.
We know they happened in abnormal cir-
cumstances. There is no question in our
minds about the respect of the Soviet Union
toward us, the respect of the Soviet Union
for our sovereignty, and, the help of the So-
viet Union. That is why what is important
to discuss is what are the steps to take in the
future. We want to reaffirm our trust in the
Soviet Union.
COMMENTS OF MIKOYAN (transcribed
by Dorticos)
Carlos Rafael: It is my understanding that
companero Mikoyan talked about the in-
spection of the Soviet ships as a Minimum
Minimorum. But that inspection would take
place in a Cuban harbor. They could well
342 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
then request the inspection of other sites in
Cuba - the forests for instance. They can
claim that the missiles could have been di-
verted from their route between the base and
the ships.
FIDEL: How would the inspection they pro-
pose take place?
Mikoyan: (transcribed by Dorticos)
FIDEL: Couldn’t they do the same on the
high seas? What is the difference?
Mikoyan: (transcribed by Dorticos)
FIDEL: Tell companero Mikoyan that I un-
derstand very well the interest of keeping U
Thant on our side, but for us, that is a criti-
cal issue. It would have a disastrous effect
on our people. The North Americans say that
the inspection is inferred from the letter from
Khrushchev to Kennedy on the 28 (Fidel is
making reference to the letter of Khrushchev [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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