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night before we flew into Tehran. That operative was still in
Tehran, helping to prepare the military rescue operation. Once
the confusion was cleared up, I showed the president some of
the Argo cover materials, then more confusion ensued. The
Oval Office photographer appeared, and Turner was uncertain
if I was authorized to be photographed with the president,
since I was working undercover.
Years passed before I would receive my picture shaking
hands with Jimmy Carter. But I was thrilled to learn that I had
been promoted to GS-15, the equivalent of a full colonel in the
military, that very same afternoon by the Director of OTS.
MY STOCK WITH the White House remained high that spring
when Hamilton Jordan, Carter s chief of staff and most trusted
confidant, asked me to prepare a disguise for him. Jordan had
arranged ultrasecret European negotiations with Iranian For-
eign Minister Sadeq Ghotbzadeh. If the meetings went well,
the Carter White House would release
306 / ANTONIO J. MENDEZWITH MALCOLM MCCONNELL
Iranian assets frozen in America in exchange for the hostages.
But the slightest hint in the press that Jordan and Ghotbzadeh
were secretly meeting would blow the deal. It was obvious
that Jordan needed a foolproof disguise.
I spent several hours with him in the White House basement
barber shop, transforming the husky, clean-cut young man
with the confident bearing of lofty authority into a rather frail,
middle-aged gentleman who could walk unrecognized past
his closest friends.
Later, Jordan would brag at singles bars around Washington
that this disguise made him look like a sleazy Latin business-
man. In my profession, that was a compliment.
IN MAY 1980, Julio and I were awarded the Intelligence Star, the
Agency s second-highest valorous decoration, at a secret cere-
mony in the Headquarters auditorium. Other CIA officers were
also being recognized for their involvement in the failed OP-
ERATION EAGLE CLAW rescue mission, in which Sea Stallion
helicopters that had secretly landed in Iran from an American
aircraft carrier in the Arabia Sea had exploded, killing eight
airmen. The classified nature of the ceremony was deemed
necessary because the American diplomats still languished as
hostages. They were not released until January 21, 1981, after
444 days in captivity.
Although I was honored to receive the award, my pride was
bittersweet while Americans remained hostage in Tehran. I
was equally displeased that I was not allowed to invite Karen
and the children or CIA friends to the ceremony, since the ex-
filtration of the six houseguests was still classified.
It was no secret to them that I had been in Iran during the
rescue of the six. As with any Agency family, they were expec-
ted to endure my
THE MASTER OF DISGUISE / 307
long absences with only scant details of the operations I con-
ducted. Whether I was in Moscow or Tehran, we could not
directly communicate, although the OTS fraternity did try to
maintain an informal flow of information to our families to
reassure them of our well-being.
For this reason, award ceremonies were important to Agency
families. The presentations, usually held in the DCI s confer-
ence room with relatives present, acknowledged their sacrifice
and the vital support they provided to the officer. However,
Admiral Turner had decided the Agency needed its own
morale boost following the EAGLE CLAW debacle and reques-
ted the closed ceremony in the Headquarters auditorium.
When OTS Director Dave Brandwein called me at home to
announce the award presentation, I was about to leave on a
twentieth-anniversary trip with Karen. Tell the Admiral I m
out of touch, I told Brandwein.
He complied, but Turner issued an edict. Find Mendez.
So it was that I received my Intelligence Star in the company
of a few friends and relative strangers, while Karen and the
children expressed their joy from a distance.
10
Endgame
For anyone tired of life, the thrilling life of a spy
should be the very finest recuperator.
Sir Robert Baden-Powell, British intelligence
officer and founder of the Boy Scouts
Washington, November 1982 " The street disguise exercise had
gone well. My special OTS team had played the role of KGB
bloodhounds, and the graduate career trainees from the Direct-
orate of Operations had been eager to display the skills they
had acquired in the IO (Internal Operations) Course. Even the
Mitteleuropa weather a nasty night of freezing rain that had
cleared the streets of Georgetown and Foggy Bottom had
added to the realism of the experience.
The IO pipeliners had survived intense months of instruc-
tion, which had led seamlessly from the paramilitary discipline
at the Farm to the more cerebral challenges of the advanced
training, focusing on their areas of assignment. They were
bright, high achievers, earmarked
308
THE MASTER OF DISGUISE / 309
for important Soviet bloc jobs in their initial overseas tours.
While reading in on the agent cases they would help manage,
they were honing the tradecraft skills needed to operate effect-
ively on hostile streets.
Although I had moved up to become Chief of Authentication
in 1979, I remained personally involved in the disguise trade-
craft training of these new officers and their spouses, and I
took a special interest in those assigned to Moscow because I
had helped refine the CLOAK-Silver Bullet procedures.
Transforming well-adjusted, law-abiding citizens into suc-
cessful case officers was always a challenging, delicate process.
By definition, the candidates had to be able to adapt to demand-
ing overseas assignments. They had to be cunning and devious
while working against the enemy, yet still retain their personal
and professional integrity. Above all, they had to demonstrate
an unwavering loyalty to their country and their colleagues,
in that order. Beyond these seemingly inconsistent attributes,
a case officer had to have that intangible flair, the ability to
orchestrate complex exercises in deception tradecraft with ease.
When the pipeliners were cycled over to OTS for their post-
graduate disguise training, I always stressed to our team that
we had a serious obligation to fulfill in screening these new
officers. Just because they had already passed muster for as-
signment to the Soviet Union didn t automatically qualify them
to use the most sensitive Silver Bullet procedures on the streets
of Moscow. These techniques were absolutely essential to our
operations and highly vulnerable if misused.
Although we did not have formal veto power over a proba-
tionary officer s future, our colleagues in the DO s Soviet-East
European (SE) Division, most of whom had been our comrades
in the field, were certainly anxious for our opinions. Much of
our evaluation of the new officers was visceral, based on an
evolving doctrine and years of
310 / ANTONIO J. MENDEZWITH MALCOLM MCCONNELL
operational experience. Our instincts could tell us that one
candidate would excel in the more specialized world of Soviet
bloc espionage, while another, despite an impressive academic
background, high language aptitude, and an engaging person-
ality, simply would not. It was similar to the informal peer
assessment soldiers had used for millennia, which boiled down
to a simple question: Would I trust my life (or an agent s) to
this person?
That night during the debriefing, one of the pipeliners, an
attractive young woman who had been considered borderline
because of her less proficient language skills, had used the
CLOAK technique and completely eluded the surveillance
team, disguising herself as a pitiful bag lady huddled on a
steam grate near the Mall by adding a rain-soaked blanket and
a tangled gray Halloween witch s wig she d bought at a cos-
tume store.
Way to go, Helen, I said, raising my can of Miller Lite.
My bloodhounds were taken aback but acknowledged that
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