CWIHP Bulletin nr 8 9 part 2 US Soviet relations and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

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Taraki thanked us for the reception which
was shown him and for the solutions to the
issues which we announced to him. I think
that it would be possible to:
1. Approve the conversations which we
had with Comrade Taraki.
2. Agree with the proposals of Com-
rades Lapin and Talyzin regarding the or-
ganization of the radio relay to Afghanistan,
and also to make a corresponding notation
in the nature of an instruction regarding the
creation of a more powerful transmitter.
ANDROPOV. That is a very good mea-
sure.
The proposal is accepted.
[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 2;
document provided by M. Kramer; transla-
tion by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]
Record of Conversation between Soviet
Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M.
Puzanov and Taraki, 22 March 1979
Taraki informs [Puzanov] about his
conversations on high-frequency radio with
Brezhnev, Kosygin, Ustinov, Gromyko, and
Ponomarev. The Soviet leadership has made
a decision “to provide political and military
assistance to the DRA in the event of ag-
gression from Iran, Pakistan,” and other
countries, to speed up the delivery of weap-
ons by air, postpone the expiration of cred-
its, present 100,000 tons of grain to the
DRA, and raise the price of Afghan natural
gas bought by the USSR. Taraki gives
thanks for the USSR declaration to Iran and
Pakistan with the condemnation of interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of the DRA.
[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad in TsKhSD,
f. 5, op. 76, d. 1044, ll. 29-30.]
[Ed. note: For a translation of a report to
the CPSU CC Politburo on the Afghan situ-
ation by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and
Ponomarev, dated 1 April 1979 and ap-
proved by the Politburo on 12 April 1979,
see CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 67-69.]
Report of the chief of the Soviet
military advisory group in Afghanistan,
Lt. Gen. L.N. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 14
April 1979 (excerpt)
Moscow
Urgent. Secret
...I was invited to see Com. Amin, who,
at the behest of N.M. Taraki, requested that
we send to Kabul some 15-20 combat heli-
copters with ammunition and Soviet crews
so that, if the situation in the outlying and
central regions deteriorates, they can be used
against bands of rebels and terrorists who
are being infiltrated from Pakistan.
In this regard, assurance was provided
that the arrival in Kabul and the use of So-
viet crews will be kept secret....
L. Gorelov
14 April 1979
INSTRUCTIONS: This should not be
done.[Marshal and Chief of Staff] N. V.
Ogarkov
[Source: B. V. Gromov, Ogranichennyi
kontingent (Moscow: Progress/Kultura,
1994), p. 78; translated by Mark Kramer.]
[Ed. note: For a translation of a CPSU CC
Politburo decison dated 21 April 1979 re-
jecting the above-mentioned request from
Amin that Moscow send Soviet helicopter
crews to participate in the fighting, see
CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 74-75.]
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 151
CPSU CC Politburo Decision and
Instruction to Soviet Ambassador in
Afghanistan, 24 May 1979
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TOP SECRET
No.P152/159
To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andro-
pov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev,
Baibakov, Patolichev, Skachkov, Serbin,
Smirtiukov
Extract from protocol No. 152 of the CC
CPSU Politburo session of 24 May 1979
About Providing Supplementary Military
Assistance to the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan
1. Approve the draft instruction of the
USSR Council of Ministers on this issue
(attached).
2. Assign Gosplan USSR and the Min-
istry of Foreign Trade to review within
weeks the request for the delivery to the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan of
1500 automobiles and to submit a proposal
on this issue.
3. Affirm the text of the instruction to
the Soviet Ambassador in the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan on this issue (at-
tached)
CC SECRETARY
[attachment:]
Re: Point 159 Prot. No. 152
Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE
To KABUL
TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
Visit N.M. Taraki and, referring to the
instruction, inform him that the Afghan
leadership’s request about the provision of
supplementary military assistance to the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have
been attentively reviewed.
Say that in Moscow they share the con- [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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