Ancient Greek Metaphysics Aristotle

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thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute belongs
is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of which
it is itself predicated, itself is.
"(2) The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated
by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just
as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what
the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation,
others activity or passivity, others its 'where', others its 'when',
'being' has a meaning answering to each of these. For there is no
difference between 'the man is recovering' and 'the man recovers',
nor between 'the man is walking or cutting' and 'the man walks' or
'cuts'; and similarly in all other cases.
"(3) Again, 'being' and 'is' mean that a statement is true, 'not being'
that it is not true but falses-and this alike in the case of affirmation
and of negation; e.g. 'Socrates is musical' means that this is true,
or 'Socrates is not-pale' means that this is true; but 'the diagonal
of the square is not commensurate with the side' means that it is
false to say it is.
"(4) Again, 'being' and 'that which is' mean that some of the things
we have mentioned 'are' potentially, others in complete reality. For
we say both of that which sees potentially and of that which sees
actually, that it is 'seeing', and both of that which can actualize
its knowledge and of that which is actualizing it, that it knows,
and both of that to which rest is already present and of that which
can rest, that it rests. And similarly in the case of substances;
we say the Hermes is in the stone, and the half of the line is in
the line, and we say of that which is not yet ripe that it is corn.
When a thing is potential and when it is not yet potential must be
explained elsewhere.
Part 8 "
"We call 'substance' (1) the simple bodies, i.e. earth and fire and
water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things
composed of them, both animals and divine beings, and the parts of
these. All these are called substance because they are not predicated
of a subject but everything else is predicated of them.-(2) That which,
being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is
the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of an animal.-(3)
The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking
them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed,
as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the
plane by the destruction of the line; and in general number is thought
by some to be of this nature; for if it is destroyed, they say, nothing
exists, and it limits all things.-(4) The essence, the formula of
which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing.
"It follows, then, that 'substance' has two senses, (A) ultimate substratum,
which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which,
being a 'this', is also separable and of this nature is the shape
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METAPHYSICS 58
or form of each thing.
Part 9 "
"'The same' means (1) that which is the same in an accidental sense,
e.g. 'the pale' and 'the musical' are the same because they are accidents
of the same thing, and 'a man' and 'musical' because the one is an
accident of the other; and 'the musical' is 'a man' because it is
an accident of the man. (The complex entity is the same as either
of the simple ones and each of these is the same as it; for both 'the
man' and 'the musical' are said to be the same as 'the musical man',
and this the same as they.) This is why all of these statements are
made not universally; for it is not true to say that every man is
the same as 'the musical' (for universal attributes belong to things
in virtue of their own nature, but accidents do not belong to them
in virtue of their own nature); but of the individuals the statements
are made without qualification. For 'Socrates' and 'musical Socrates'
are thought to be the same; but 'Socrates' is not predicable of more
than one subject, and therefore we do not say 'every Socrates' as
we say 'every man'.
"Some things are said to be the same in this sense, others (2) are
the same by their own nature, in as many senses as that which is one
by its own nature is so; for both the things whose matter is one either
in kind or in number, and those whose essence is one, are said to
be the same. Clearly, therefore, sameness is a unity of the being
either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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